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Skew Selection Theory Applied to the
Wealth and Welfare of Nations
SUSAN F. ALLEN
DEBY L. CASSILL
College of Arts and Sciences
University of South Florida St. Petersburg
According to skew selection theory, working citizens who build
wealth and, at the same time, share portions of their wealth with
those in need are more likely to survive economic downturns than
citizens who hoard wealth. In this article, skew selection is employed
as a theoreticalframework to support governmental efforts to develop
social policies that protect the income of working citizens and, at the
same time, provide for vulnerable, non-working children and elders.
To illustrate its applicability, the social policies of Japan, Sweden
and the United States-all of which are challenged by decaying
ratios of working to non-working citizens-are compared through
the lens of skew selection. Policy recommendations are discussed.
Key words: comparative social policy, social welfare, Japan,
Sweden, United States, bioeconomics
"If the misery of the poor be caused not by the laws of nature,
but by our institutions, great is our sin."
Charles Darwin, 1839/1989, p. 2
Skew selection, an economic theory based on biological
principles, models competition and cooperation as two self-
interested survival strategies used by animals to cope with two
agents of death-scarcity and aggression (Cassill 2003, 2006).
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According to skew selection, the duality of human behaviors,
competition and compassion, has been shaped over evolution-
ary time by scarcity and aggression respectively. In today's
world, competition can be measured by wealth building and
compassion by wealth sharing.
In this article, we present skew selection as a theoretical
framework to validate the dual roles of government: promot-
ing wealth building, and at the same time, promoting wealth
sharing. Specifically, we propose that skew selection theory
can support governmental efforts to develop social policies
that protect working citizens and, at the same time, provide
for dependent children and frail elders. First, we explain skew
selection theory and then we use the comparative examples of
Sweden, Japan, and the United States to apply the theory to
governmental social policies. Finally, using the tenets of skew
selection theory, we discuss how the wealthiest country, the
U.S., can better manage its three most important resources: its
children, its workers, and its elderly.
Skew Selection Theory
In nature, the two organizing principles shape animal be-
havior. They are aggression by predators and cycles of food
abundance and scarcity. In humans, the source of scarcity is
lack of income; the source of aggression is stealing, murder
or war by other humans. Skew selection theory posits that
an individual's most successful response to the dual threats
of scarcity and aggression is a curious combination of wealth
building and wealth sharing (Cassill, 2006; Cassill & Hill, 2007;
Cassill & Watkins, 2004). The combination of wealth building
and wealth sharing reduces inequality, but does not eliminate
it, as the donor always keeps more than he or she gives away.
Skew selection equates income inequality to diversity, not
poverty. Diversity and poverty are independent conditions.
By themselves, diversity and inequality do not cause poverty.
Likewise, uniformity and equality do not eliminate poverty.
We can be equally or unequally poor, and equally or unequally
rich. In reality, chronic poverty is a uniquely human condi-
tion. The causes are political, not environmental. Thus, just as
Darwin (1839/1989) feared, "great is our sin" (p. 2).
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For skew selection theory, inequality equates with di-
versity. To illustrate, in Figure 1 animals are first grouped
vertically into an organizational hierarchy based on their
diverse body sizes. Tip the hierarchy on its side, and the same
animals become grouped horizontally as a histogram display-
ing inequality of body size. The point is this: the foundation of
diversity-a good thing-is inequality.
Figure 1. Animals grouped into two graphic forms to illustrate the
interchangeability of inequality and diversity
744
What is the proof that skew selection, which describes the
inherent diversity among animals, is a superior distribution
pattern to parity and equality? Skew theory has its roots in
the study of social insects, particularly ants. Mature ant queens
skew the fertility of their offspring, producing hundreds of
large fertile daughters called virgin queens, and thousands
of small sterile daughters called workers in a 1:20 ratio. The
role of the thousands of sterile workers is to feed, shelter and
defend their fertile sisters and their queen mother (Cassill,
2006). Skewing the size and fertility of daughters is an incred-
ibly successful allocation strategy as ant queens are known to
live 20 to 45 years-longer than cats, dogs or horses. A recent
study discovered that mated queens skew the social status
of their fertile daughters, the virgin queens, as well (Cassill,
Kuriachan, & Vinson, 2007). Dominant virgins are large. Once
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they disperse from the natal nest and have mated, they lay sig-
nificantly more eggs per day than their smaller, subordinate
sisters. Dominant and subordinate queens survive significant-
ly longer when they found a family together, in one nest, and
share resources than when they found a family alone, in sepa-
rate nests. Pooling their resources (their labor force of sterile
workers) increased their longevity and their individual fecun-
dity (equivalent to wealth) two-fold. In Figure 2, we see that
skewing offspring size and fertility allows ant queens to in-
crease group size without jeopardizing the body size of virgin
queens.
Other examples of wealth building and wealth sharing
are found in human DNA, sperm, body cells, institutions and
political philosophies. In humans, more than 97% of DNA se-
quences have no function. These non-functional DNA sequenc-
es, called junk DNA, do not produce the proteins (enzymes
or structural proteins) that determine our body's form and
function. According to skew selection theory, the junk DNA
sequences shield the functional DNA sequences, called genes,
from invading viruses (Cassill,'2005). With so much junk DNA,
the probability that an invading virus will disable a functional
gene sequence is close to zero. Thus, the wealth-building genes
(functional DNA) are significantly more likely to survive and
reproduce when they share shelter and nutrients with non-
functional DNA sequences.
Cells in the testes of human males produce two kinds of
sperm-healthy, high-energy sperm and sluggish, low-energy
sperm. Only a small portion of sperm, often fewer than 10%,
has sufficient energy stores (i.e. wealth) to complete the ten-
hour swim from the vagina to their goal-the egg. Why would
nature skew sperm ability? The answer lles in the vagina.
Vaginas are a tropical paradise, providing nutrients, warmth
and shelter for billions of microbes in the form of bacteria, pro-
tozoa, and fungi. The large number of low-energy (i.e. poor)
sperm form a living barrier within which the few well-provi-
sioned (i.e. wealthy) sperm can hide, and thus avoid death by
the vagina's predatory microbes. In a nutshell, a large number
of disposable sperm guarantees that at least one healthy sperm
will reach an egg.
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Figure 2. When resources are divided equally among offspring,
parents must sacrifice offspring body size to gain litter size. When
resources are skewed, meaning that they are divided unequally
among offspring, parents can gain litter size without sacrificing
body size.
Wealth building and sharing occurs among other body's
cells as well. Once the egg is fertilized by the sperm, this single,
omnipotent cell, called a zygote, replicates, divides and dif-
ferentiates into two kinds of body cells-mortal and immortal.
Numerically, the difference is extreme. During their lifetime,
females produce hundreds of immortal eggs; males produce
billions of immortal sperm. But, the number of immortal cells
is nothing compared to the trillions and trillions of mortal cells,
called somatic cells that make up a human's organs, tissues
and bones. Curiously, in humans and other animals, somatic
cells are programmed to die. When somatic cells stop pro-
ducing replacement cells, organs shrink and eventually fail,
causing the death of the organism (if that organism has not
already succumbed to disease, predators or starvation). Only
the eggs and sperm, the germ cells, are immortal, and are thus
able to replicate themselves, creating generation after genera-
tion of organisms. Richard Dawkins (1976) was amazingly in-
tuitive when he wrote that a chicken is an egg's way of making
another egg.
Can we apply the lessons learned from ants, DNA, sperm
and cells to humans? We think so. If wealthy donors do not re-
distribute some of their excess wealth, the poor cannot survive
on their own. On the other hand, without the poor, wealthy
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donors would not survive periods of high aggression (i.e.
war). Thus, wealth-building and wealth-sharing are reciprocal,
not opposing, strategies by which wealthy donors and needy
recipients benefit in terms of survival and longevity.
Stated a different way, wealth building and wealth sharing
doubly indemnify individuals against job loss and aggression.
Both donor and recipient live longer and happier compared
to those who hoard and do not share when income is scarce.
Hence, even our most cherished moral behavior-helping
those who cannot help themselves-is self-interested mutual-
ism rather than self-sacrificing altruism.
Families, military institutions, academic institutions
and corporations are microcosms of skew selection at work.
Diversity of members among family, military, academic or
corporate institutions is a hierarchy of inequality (Figure
1). In each case, a few highly experienced members oversee
the efforts of the many, less experienced members. Families,
military institutions, academic institutions and corporations
build and share their wealth by fostering the young and inex-
perienced and then moving them up the hierarchical ladder
based on their productivity and performance. Those that are
unproductive remain in their current positions within the hi-
erarchy indefinitely. These individuals are the most vulner-
able members of the hierarchy, and without knowing it, serve
to buffer those further up the hierarchy from outside agents
of death or destruction-those unpredictable acts of nature.
Although unpredictable acts of nature can wound institutions,
they rarely destroy them. Destruction usually occurs from
within when institutions fail to encourage wealth building and
wealth sharing among their members.
How do these examples relate to government's role in
promoting social policy? In a capitalistic democracy, income
inequality is a natural result of variation in an individual's
luck, motivation, and ability (Cassill & Watkins, 2004). When
those who gain wealth share with those in need, both donor
and recipient live longer (Cassill & Watkins, in press). This is
largely supported by studies of life expectancy in countries
with varying levels of income equality (Gudrais, 2008). The
role of government is to maintain a healthy balance between
wealth building and wealth sharing. The degree to which
120
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governments promote wealth building and wealth sharing
depends on their country's history, demographics, geography,
economies, and neighbors. When economies are growing and
aggression is low, able-bodied citizens are free to accumulate
wealth to the best of their ability and motivation. When income
is scarce and aggression high, it is the responsibility of wealthy
citizens to share increments of their wealth with those in need
(Hill & Cassill, 2004; Cassill & Hill, 2007). The role of govern-
ment is to reasonably tax the wealthy and reasonably direct the
redistribution.
There are examples throughout history of abuses by the
"powerful and privileged" (Ehrlich & Lui, 1999; Haile, Sadrieh,
& Verbon, 2003). Currently, with the recent crash of Wall Street
and banking institutions, and the resulting deep recession in
the U.S., we are acutely aware of the foible of focusing pri-
marily on wealth building. The shortsighted greed by such
corporations as Enron, Arthur Andersen, and WorldCom and
the excesses of CEO compensations and unregulated loans
have resulted in the collapse of a once invincible U.S. economy
(Cassill & Hill, 2007). The move toward corporate social respon-
sibility is healing the damage that unchecked greed created
(Hill & Cassill, 2004). Therefore, it is important to differentiate
between benign wealth building and malignant wealth build-
ing (Hill & Cassill, 2004; Vehrencamp, 1983).
Benign wealth building involves stockpiling during
seasons when resources are super-abundant and builds capac-
ity for wealth sharing when resources are scarcer. Malignant
wealth building is an anti-Robin Hood strategy of "taking
from the poor and giving to the rich" as seems to be occur-
ring as main street U.S. is bailing out Wall Street via a trillion
dollar "rescue plan" approved by the U.S. Congress in October,
2008. Governments and corporations that engage in malignant
wealth-building will eventually suffer, as it is not balanced with
wealth sharing. Those institutions that share not only survive
longer, they prosper compared to those that hoard (Cassill &
Watkins, in press).
However, a singular focus on wealth sharing to reach
parity can be just as shortsighted and destructive as a singu-
lar focus on wealth building. During the 20th century, the mass
starvation of tens of millions of humans in the Soviet Union
121
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and China was a direct result of their philosophy on the power
of parity, also called communism (reviewed in Tulchinsky &
Varavikova, 1996; Deininger, Jin, & Yu, 2007). Public funds were
distributed to the poor, mostly rural, populations, irrespec-
tive of the quality and quantity of work that they produced.
Incentives for food stockpiling were gone. When natural di-
sasters struck, food had not been sufficiently stockpiled (or
was not distributed where needed). Famine reigned; death
resulted.
Skew Selection Theory Applied to Governments
Wealth building and wealth sharing are complementary
strategies for surviving dynamic environments such as those
experienced by today's developed nations. Developing gov-
ernmental policies that promote wealth building and wealth
sharing to protect workers and non-workers is a challenge for
any government. The challenge is exacerbated by the fact that
health and wealth is a moving target that can shift repeatedly
throughout one's lifetime from dependent childhood through
independent adulthood to dependent late adulthood, as citi-
zens are born, mature, and age. Developed countries, such as
Japan, Sweden, and the United States, are facing a burden re-
sulting from their wealth. Namely, citizens are living longer
and, at the same time, families are having fewer children.
Consequently, the proportion of non-working citizens is in-
creasing at the same time that the proportion of working citi-
zens is decreasing (Anderson & Hussey, 2000; Castles, 2003;
Ozawa, 1999). In short, the challenge that these governments
face is a decaying ratio of working to non-working citizens.
Several factors have contributed to the decay in the ratio of
working to non-working citizens. Low birthrates, often short
of the two needed as a replacement rate for workers, have led
to a lower portion of maturing citizens entering the work force
(Anderson & Hussey, 2000; Castles, 2003; Martin & Kats, 2003).
At the same time, the number of dependent elders has in-
creased because of early retirement, better health care, greater
longevity, and medically extended periods of dying (Anderson
& Hussey; Harper, 2006; Shea et al., 2003). Adding to the de-
caying ratio of working to non-working citizens is the fact
that lower rates of marriage, higher rates of divorce, and two
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working parents have led to a larger number of women enter-
ing the workforce (Martin & Kats, 2003). Although the addition
of working women is beneficial for a government's economy,
there is a double-edged downside. First, the low-wage jobs
they perform means that a larger number of dependent chil-
dren are in need of services, such as government-subsidized or
government-run child care facilities (Allen, 2003; Mahon, 2002;
Palley & Bowman, 2002). Second, as women enter the work
force, they are no longer available to care for their older rela-
tives (Harper, 2006). Consequently, the government takes on
more responsibility to pay for the care of frail elders (Mahon,
2002; Shea et al., 2003).
Table 1. Economic Profiles of Japan, Sweden, and the U.S.
Japan Sweden U.S.
Total GDP in millions,
Tt.a in m b6 ' $3,943,754 $280,305 $12,409,460mnternational $ b
GDP per capita, inter-GDPoa pr cb6 $30,821 $31,062 $41,854national $ b
Social expenditure as a 16.89 28.92 14.78
% of GDP a2
Gini index (a measure 38.13 25' 455
of income skew) d
Taxes as a percentage 25.3 50.6 25.6
of GDP c4
Sources: a Social Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP, 2005 (Columbia University);
bUnited Nation Statistics Division-Common Database, 2007; c Tax Policy Center,
n.d.; d CIA, 2007
Year of data: 12000; 22001; 32002; 42003,52004, 62005
We describe the demographics, economics, and social poli-
cies in three developed countries-Japan, Sweden, and the
U.S.-in order to apply the principles of skew selection. These
countries were selected because they are all wealthy nations
facing the challenge of a shrinking ratio of working to non-
working citizens. However, the demographic and socio-cul-
tural characteristics of Japan, Sweden, and the United States
are different and each government's response to the decay-
ing ratio of working to non-working citizens in terms of their
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policies for wealth building and wealth sharing is unique. The
goal of our analysis is to compare the current priorities of each
government for protecting the income of wealth builders and,
at the same time, providing for its vulnerable citizens through
wealth sharing. We first compare these nations in terms of
gross domestic product (GDP), taxes, and demographics. Then
we compare their social policies for protecting dependent chil-
dren and frail elders. Our intention is not to provide answers,
but rather to provide a sensible framework upon which gov-
ernments can analyze and adjust social policies to protect their
greatest resource-their working and non-working citizens.
Wealth and Welfare of Citizens
Table 1 presents economic profiles of Japan, Sweden, and the
U.S. Despite large variations in total GDP, the GDP per capita
is roughly equivalent among U.S., Japanese and Swedish citi-
zens. Although the GDP per capita tells us that citizens of each
country are equivalently productive, it tells us little about the
spread of wealth among its citizens. To compare wealth, other
indicators are needed. The Gini index is an indicator of wealth
building. Tax rates and social expenditures as a percent of the
GDP are indicators of wealth sharing. Using these metrics, we
find dramatic differences in the wealth and poverty of U.S.,
Japanese and Swedish citizens. According to the Gini index,
if the poorest 2 0 1h percentile of citizens in the U.S., Japan and
Sweden averaged $10,000 a year, then the wealthiest 20t per-
centile of citizens per country averaged $450,000, $381,000 and
$250,000 respectively. Wealthy U.S. citizens are 18% wealthier
than Japan's wealthy citizens and 80% wealthier than Sweden's
wealthy citizens. The U.S. has the greatest degree of income in-
equality among its citizens (see Gudrais, 2008; Phillips, 2002).
By itself, a large gap in the distribution of wealth is not a "bad"
thing. If a country's poverty rates are low (i.e. the vast ma-
jority of citizens are well cared for), then income inequality is
benign and extreme wealth is harmless. Indeed, wealth is es-
sential if we are to remediate the triarchy of poverty: famine,
disease and illiteracy. It is poverty, rather than wealth, that is
the shame of governments.
How do responsive governments redistribute wealth to
fund programs for non-working citizens-young and old-
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without discouraging its working citizens in their quest to
build their own wealth? From the beginning of human time,
socially responsive individuals have shared portions of their
wealth with those in need (Hill & Cassill, 2004), as have reli-
gious institutions. More recently, socially responsive corporate
institutions have developed wealth-sharing programs (Hill &
Cassill, 2004; Cassill & Hill, 2007). However, by far the most
powerful and influential institution for building and redistrib-
uting wealth to remediate poverty is government. Its method
of choice for wealth building is the tax rate. Its method of
wealth sharing is a matter of social policy and allotment of ex-
penditures. Governments may promote the social welfare of
citizens by increasing expenditures on institutions to benefit
them, such as education and training, or by reducing expen-
ditures on institutions that could do individuals harm, such as
prisons.
Table 2. Demographic Profiles of Japan, Sweden, and the U.S.
Japan Sweden U.S.
Population (in thousands) 6 127,687 8,993 293,623
Foreign population as % of total b4 1.5 5.3 11.5
% over 64 years old b5 19 17.2 12.3
% under 15 years old b5 15 17.9 20.9
Fertility rate c 1.331 1.654 2.033
Births to unmarried women as %
of all live births c2
Life expectancy at birth c
Male 76.14 75.44 74.43
Female 82.24 80.84 79.83
Poverty rate
Overall 15.3 d1 6.5 e2 17.0e2
Over 64 years old 1 9 .5 *dl 2.1 e2 28.4 e 2
Under 18 years old, All 14.3 d 3.8e2 18.8e2
Under 18 years old, Single na 11.3e2 41.4e2
parent households
Sources: aUnited Nations Statistics Division--Common Database, 2007;
bDemography in OECD Countries, 2005 (Columbia University);
IHealth Indicators ie n OECD Countries (Columbia University);
d Tachibanaki, 2006; Smeeding, 2005
Year of data: 1late 1990s; 22000; 32001; 42002; s2003, 62004 Note: *Ages 66-75
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Comparing tax rates among our three countries, we find
that the country with the least wealth, Sweden, has the highest
tax rate-twice that of the U.S. and Japan-and the highest
social expenditure. These data suggest that the U.S. and Japan
emphasize wealth building more than wealth sharing, whereas
Sweden emphasizes wealth sharing more than wealth build-
ing "to further the goal of social equality" (Blomqvist, 2004, p.
151). The important question is-does wealth sharing in the
form of allotment of social expenditures result in reduced rates
of poverty? Before we address the relationship between wealth
building, wealth sharing, and poverty, we must review the dif-
ferences in the demographics of each country.
Demographics
Demographic factors, which directly affect the social poli-
cies governing wealth building and sharing, vary among the
three countries as shown on Table 2. The U.S. has more than
twice as many foreigners as Sweden and more than 10 times
as many as Japan. In short, the U.S. has a significantly larger
and more diverse citizenry than Japan and Sweden. If diver-
sity is sanctioned and embraced, it can strengthen an economy
and enrich a nation's culture; on the other hand, if diversity
is compartmentalized and vilified, it can become a source of
poverty. In fact, it may be that in nations or even neighbor-
hoods where there is greater diversity there is more reluctance
to share wealth for the common good of those unlike oneself
(Gudrais, 2008).
Compared to the U.S., Japan and Sweden have a larger
proportion of elderly citizens (Anderson & Hussey, 2000)
and a faster rate of aging citizens. Since 1970, the percent-
age of elderly citizens in Japan has almost tripled from 7% to
19% (Hashimoto & Takahashi, 1995; Demography in OECD
Countries, 2005). This dramatic increase was fueled by Japan's
longer life expectancy for both men and women. Likewise, the
percentage of elderly citizens in Sweden has almost tripled
to 17.2% of its population (Demography in OECD Countries,
2005), although Sweden's citizens took 85 years to age com-
pared to Japan's 30 years (Hashimoto & Takahashi, 1995).
The rapid increase in the proportion of elderly citizens
126
Skew Selection Theory
has contributed significantly to the declining ratio of working
to non-working citizens. In response to the declining ratio,
Sweden and Japan have developed social policies to increase
the work force by encouraging women to participate and, at
the same time, to bear more children (Allen, 2003). Sweden is
slowly reversing its downward trend in fertility rates into the
21st century (Castles, 2003). On the other hand, despite these
social policies, Japan's fertility rate and the percentage of chil-
dren have continued to decline into the 2 1st century (Segal,
2004).
Compared to Sweden and Japan, the U.S. has a large pro-
portion of children and a high fertility rate (Martin & Kats,
2003). Childbearing is greatest among U.S. teens and unmar-
ried mothers, placing significant pressure on the government
to help children in low-income households headed by teens
or single mothers. In response to this need, U.S. social policies
are targeted at promoting marriage and discouraging child-
bearing by teens and other unmarried mothers (Brotherson &
Duncan, 2004).
Wealth Redistribution to Children and Elderly Citizens
In developed countries, poverty is a function of social
policy (Bradshaw, 2006). In the U.S., child poverty rates are
five times higher than they are in Sweden (see Table 2). Close
to half of U.S. children being raised in single parent families
live in poverty. From the authors' perspectives, this is an em-
barrassing commentary on one of history's most wealthy and
compassionate countries (Conley, 2003). An important factor
may be that in the U.S. support for children is viewed as the
responsibility of parents rather than government (Grason &
Guyer, 1995). Because of the hands-off approach on matters of
child and family poverty, programs for children of the U.S. are
not universal. Programs that are available target only the very
poorest children. As a consequence, U.S. government programs
for children are often highly stigmatized. Moreover, they are
ineffective, decreasing the high rate of child poverty only a few
percentage points (Impact of Taxes and Transfers, 2005).
Given its wealth, the U.S. can afford to vanquish the
triarchy of poverty, disease and illiteracy by funding basic
nutrition, health care and education for all of its children. If
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the U.S. government does not respect and nurture its children,
poor and otherwise, it is damaging the upcoming generation
of working citizens, as today's children are the hands that will
eventually build the wealth needed to provide for today's
working citizens as they transition into elders.
In Sweden, the government has reduced child poverty 74%
by implementing cash benefits to families (Bradshaw, 2006). In
Japan, government policies have also reduced child poverty
considerably (Segal, 2004), though to a lesser extent than in
Sweden. When we analyze the high rates of wealth and the
high rates of child poverty in the U.S. through the lens of skew
selection, it is easy to see that the U.S., for all its wealth, does
not promote wealth sharing to its vulnerable citizens to the
degree that Sweden and Japan do. Social policies emphasizing
some form of universal health care for children and families,
like those in Sweden and Japan, could ameliorate poverty rates
in the U.S.
What about poverty among the elderly? In contrast to child
poverty in the U.S., which is viewed by the government as the
responsibility of families, programs for elderly U.S. citizens are
viewed as the responsibility of government (Grason & Guyer,
1995). As a result, social policies for the elderly in the U.S. are
more universal. "The elderly.. .enjoy universal entitlement to
national health insurance through Medicare, a uniform-level
of income security, and an organized system of community-
based health, nutritional, and social support services" (Grason
& Guyer, 1995, p. 567). Despite the overall high rate of funding
for the elderly in the U.S., there remains a high level of poverty,
particularly among single, elderly female citizens (Anderson
& Hussey, 2000). Nevertheless, because U.S. policies for its
elderly citizens are universal, the elderly are better protected
than children are during times of high unemployment and eco-
nomic strain (Axinn & Stern, 1985; Pati, Keren, Alessandrini, &
Schwarz, 2004).
In Japan, the elderly receive an even higher rate of funding,
including universal health care, than do the elderly in the U.S.
(Anderson & Hussey, 2000; Lynch, 2001). In Sweden, funding
for its elderly citizens continues at a lower rate relative to the
U.S. or Japan (Lynch, 2001), even though Sweden devotes a
larger percent of the GDP to social spending than do Japan
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or the U.S. Still, poverty rates for Swedish elders are low. A
contributing cause might be that working citizens have in-
creased their contributions toward social insurance pensions
(i.e. 7% percent of personal income; 9% of earnings) [Palley
& Bowman, 2002]. With its aging population and its declining
birth rate, too little wealth building combined with too much
wealth sharing has created a strain on Sweden's ability to meet
its obligations to all its citizens. Today, Sweden is re-evaluating
its social policies, including social insurance pensions.
Discussion
In nature, there is power in wealth and there is power in
numbers. Wealth building in the form of body fat, food caches
or defending prime territories are examples of how organisms
bridge gaps in resources. Wealth sharing to attract crowds
allows organisms to avoid predators. Herein, we hold that
these laws-of-nature apply to governments as well. When cor-
porate environments are dominated by recessions and take-
over bids (the equivalent of famine and predation), the wealthy
and the masses depend on the government for long-term sur-
vival by redistributing some wealth to those in need. Indeed,
the wealthy that ignore the numerical power of the masses not
only lose labor and future profits, they expose themselves to
predatory takeover. Likewise, the masses who overthrow the
wealthy profiteers lack the ability to attract funding to rebuild
the corporate structure that employed them. Several govern-
mental policies have been proposed to avoid investor abuse
or worker slackness (Cassill & Hill 2007): (1) transparency of
investor identities; (2) transparency of corporate goals, objec-
tives and means; (3) two-way communication up and down the
corporate hierarchy that includes collective bargaining for em-
ployees; and (4) the purchase of a priori corporate malpractice
insurance rather than post priori bankruptcy for failed corpora-
tions. To fund these strategies, wealth builders might forego
an increment of annual profit, although this will be offset by
significant gains in a corporation's long-term survival, stabil-
ity and lifetime profits.
Diverse institutions, including governments, corpora-
tions, and universities, have a life span just as do individuals.
Skew Selection Theory 129
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Thus, institutions are subject to the laws of natural selection.
For example, governments risk loss of citizens if they do not
evolve and adapt to changing conditions. Recent animal ex-
periments and computer simulation experiments (Cassill et
al., 2007; Cassill & Watkins, 2004; Cassill & Watkins, in press)
confirmed that income skew is a predictable and natural result
of building wealth when resources are abundant. The experi-
ments also confirmed that wealth sharing increases the life
span of both donors and recipients.
Given that wealth building and wealth sharing are recipro-
cal survival strategies, we assert that wealthy institutions that
promote the ability of working citizens to acquire wealth and,
at the same time, facilitate the responsibility of those same citi-
zens to share increments of their wealth with others in need,
are more robust to economic downturns and aggression than
are institutions that advocate for one without the other. Indeed,
institutions that ignore the misery of the poor are not only cul-
turally immoral, they are biologically and economically unsus-
tainable (Cassill & Watkins, in press).
When the ratio of working to non-working citizens de-
clines, governments must make some hard choices. To counter
its declining ratio of working to non-working citizens, one ap-
proach is for developed countries, such as Japan, Sweden and
the U.S., to remove disincentives and/or offer incentives for the
elderly, who are living longer and healthier, to retool their skills
as needed and work more years (AARP, 2006; OECD, 2000).
As a nation with a high proportion of children in poverty, the
U.S. should consider universal programs for children more in
line with U.S. policies for older adults (Grason & Guyer, 1995;
Newacheck & Benjamin, 2004; Ozawa, 1999).
As members of one of the wealthiest countries in the
world, we consider the misery of U.S. children our greatest
shame. Shortchanging children today shortchanges the ability
of those same children to grow into adults who will generate
wealth tomorrow. Likewise, shortchanging the elderly today
denies them their just reward for their tax contributions to the
welfare of others (Dalley, 1999). Sweden, Japan and the U.S.
are remarkable democracies with the capacity to promote the
freedom of working citizens to acquire wealth and, at the same
time, to assure their responsibility to protect those in need.
130
In conclusion, we challenge wealth builders-governmen-
tal policymakers, corporations, and individual philanthro-
pists-to embrace wealth sharing as a 2 1st century goal. Let us
follow the lead of the Carnegies, the Rockefellers, Ted Turner,
Bill Gates, Carl Venter and Brad Pitt in not only redistributing
wealth through conspicuous consumption, but by investing in
our young and elderly when they are in need.
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